Summary
The server trusts all reverse-proxy headers by default, so any remote client can spoof X-Forwarded-For to bypass IP-based protections (AllowIPs, API IP whitelist, “localhost-only” checks). All IP-based access control becomes ineffective.
Details
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Gin is created with defaults (gin.Default()), which sets TrustedProxies = 0.0.0.0/0 and uses X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IP to compute ClientIP().
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IP-based controls rely on ClientIP():
- AllowIPs / BindDomain (core/middleware/ip_limit.go, core/utils/security/security.go).
- API IP whitelist (core/middleware/api_auth.go).
- "localhost-only" checks that depend on
ClientIP().
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Because no trusted-proxy range is enforced, any client can send X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 (or a whitelisted IP) and be treated as coming from that address.
Impact
All IP-based access control is rendered ineffective: remote clients can masquerade as localhost or any whitelisted IP, defeating AllowIPs, API IP whitelists, and “localhost-only” protections.
References
Threonine Reporter
Summary
The server trusts all reverse-proxy headers by default, so any remote client can spoof
X-Forwarded-Forto bypass IP-based protections (AllowIPs, API IP whitelist, “localhost-only” checks). All IP-based access control becomes ineffective.Details
Gin is created with defaults (
gin.Default()), which setsTrustedProxies = 0.0.0.0/0and usesX-Forwarded-For/X-Real-IPto computeClientIP().IP-based controls rely on
ClientIP():ClientIP().Because no trusted-proxy range is enforced, any client can send
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1(or a whitelisted IP) and be treated as coming from that address.Impact
All IP-based access control is rendered ineffective: remote clients can masquerade as localhost or any whitelisted IP, defeating AllowIPs, API IP whitelists, and “localhost-only” protections.
References