Summary

A logic error in Traefik's experimental ingress-nginx provider inverts the semantics of the nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/proxy-ssl-verify annotation. Setting the annotation to "on" (intending to enable backend TLS certificate verification) actually disables verification, allowing man-in-the-middle attacks against HTTPS backends when operators believe they are protected.

Details

In pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/kubernetes.go at line 512, the InsecureSkipVerify field is set using inverted logic:

nst := &namedServersTransport{
    Name: provider.Normalize(namespace + "-" + name),
    ServersTransport: &dynamic.ServersTransport{
        ServerName:         ptr.Deref(cfg.ProxySSLName, ptr.Deref(cfg.ProxySSLServerName, "")),
        InsecureSkipVerify: strings.ToLower(ptr.Deref(cfg.ProxySSLVerify, "off")) == "on",
    },
}

The expression == "on" evaluates to true when the annotation is "on", setting InsecureSkipVerify: true. In Go's crypto/tls, InsecureSkipVerify: true means "do not verify the server's certificate" — the opposite of what proxy-ssl-verify: "on" should do according to NGINX semantics.

Current behavior:

Expected behavior (per NGINX semantics):

The test in pkg/provider/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/kubernetes_test.go lines 397-403 confirms this inverted behavior is codified as "expected":

ServersTransports: map[string]*dynamic.ServersTransport{
    "default-ingress-with-proxy-ssl": {
        ServerName:         "whoami.localhost",
        InsecureSkipVerify: true,  // Wrong: should be false when annotation is "on"
        RootCAs:            []types.FileOrContent{"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"},
    },
},

Affected versions: v3.5.0 through current master (introduced in commit 9bd5c617820f2a8d23b50b68d114bb7bc464eccd)

Pavel Kohout
Aisle Research